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Stephen M. Fishert
The recent surge in renewable energy development has underscored the
difficulties faced by electric transmission providers in providing grid access to
a growing number of electric power developers. In many regions of the nation,
interconnection queues are severely backlogged, with hundreds of projects
awaiting grid connection-many of which are necessary to satisfy state
renewable energy mandates. This Note examines the problem of generator
interconnection and the underlying causes of the current interconnection queue
backlogs. The Note criticizes the current interconnection policies promulgated
under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Order No. 2003, evaluates
recent regional efforts toward reforming these policies, and suggests additional
measures that would increase the efficiency of the generator interconnection
process.
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Introduction
"Take a number ... and a seat." Such is the message many U.S. electric
power developers are hearing these days upon seeking access to the grid1 and
finding themselves at the very end of an already crowded interconnection
queue. Over the last several years, transmission planners have been inundated
with requests from power developers seeking grid access, an influx that, in
most regions, has been driven primarily by a sharp increase in renewable
energy development. In particular, the U.S. wind energy industry has witnessed
explosive growth over the past five years, a trend that has been widely reported
by industry observers and, more recently, the mainstream media.3 In 2007, for
example, over 5000 megawatts4 of wind energy were installed in the United
States, representing a total investment of over $9 billion. 5 However, less
obvious from this success story are the increasing difficulties faced by regional
1 The "grid" generally refers to the network of electric power transmission lines and
associated equipment used for the long-distance transport of bulk electricity. The U.S. grid is composed
of three effectively separate networks: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the
Texas Interconnection. See Paul L. Joskow, Transmission Policy in the United States, 13 UTIL. POL'Y
95, 97 (2005). Bulk power transmission is one of three functions served by the electric power industry in
addition to power generation and retail power distribution.
2 Interconnection is, most basically, the procedure by which an electric power generator is
physically and electrically connected to the existing power grid. The interconnection queue is the
process by which prospective generation projects are grouped and ordered by transmission planners to
evaluate the potential impacts of new generation projects on the existing power grid. The list of
prospective generation projects is often referred to as the interconnection queue. Queue priority is
established on a first-come, first-served basis; a lower queue number therefore corresponds to higher
queue priority.
3 See, e.g., Brit T. Brown & Benjamin A. Escobar, Wind Power: Generating Electricity and
Lawsuits, 28 ENERGY L.J. 489, 489-91 (2007); Clifford Krauss, Move Over, Oil, There's Money in
Texas Wind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at Al.
4 A megawatt (MW) is the most common metric used for measuring the output of an electric
power plant. Roughly speaking, one MW of electric power capacity is sufficient to provide power for
1000 average residential homes.
5 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, 2008-ANOTHER RECORD YEAR FOR NEW WIND
INSTALLATIONS (2008), http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/MarketUpdate.pdf.
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transmission providers 6 in managing interconnection services for the massive
7influx of wind and solar energy projects currently seeking transmission access.
These difficulties are readily apparent from the current status of regional
interconnection queues-many are backlogged with hundreds of power
projects, representing tens of thousands of megawatts of generating capacity. 8
In addition, project sponsors have reported delays of up to several months in
project development owing to the interconnection process.9
The question, then, is why generator interconnection is so difficult. In
today's "plug-and-play" world of personal computers and multimedia devices,
interconnecting a power generator to the grid may seem all too simple a task.
From an engineering perspective, however, generator interconnection has
always presented a rather complicated technical problem that has only
increased in complexity as regional transmission networks have become more
highly integrated.'0 Yet planners face their greatest challenge not in
engineering technical solutions, but rather in balancing the many competing
transmission policy objectives inherent in the open-access framework of
competitive electricity markets. Whereas policy considerations were once
limited to cost and network reliability, today's transmission planners must
6 In this paper, the term "transmission provider" refers to an entity that controls access to the
transmission system and provides and prices transmission services. The transmission provider may or
may not be the actual owner of the transmission system, as some transmission systems are owned and
operated by separate entities. Where the distinction must be made between transmission owners and
providers, this Note uses the term "transmission system owners" for the former. Independent
transmission providers are classified as either Independent System Operators (ISOs) or Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs). An ISO is an independent entity that coordinates transmission
services over a geographic area. See LORRIN PHILIPSON & H. LEE WILLIS, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC
UTILITIES AND DE-REGULATION 44 (2d ed. 2006). An RTO is similar to an ISO but is required to fulfill
additional criteria. There are currently ten iSOs and RTOs in North America, which serve two-thirds of
the electric power customers in the United States. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, IRC SOURCEBOOK 2007, at 4
(2007), http://www.isorto.org/site/c.jhKQIZPBImE/b.2604455/k.C323/Members.htm. The ISOs and
RTOs operating in North America are Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO), California ISO
(CAISO), Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), Ontario's Independent Electricity System
Operator (IESO), ISO New England (ISO-NE), Midwest ISO (MISO), New York ISO (NYISO), New
Brunswick System Operator (NBSO), PJM Interconnection (PJM), and Southwest Power Pool (SPP).
Id.
7 To be sure, the problems in obtaining grid access are neither specific to nor caused solely by
renewable energy developers-all power developers appear to be facing the same interconnection
difficulties, regardless of their generation technology. Indeed, in some regions, most projects awaiting
interconnection rely not on wind or solar energy, but rather on fossil-fuel or other generating
technologies. For example, as of November 7, 2008, the ISO-NE interconnection queue included only
one wind project out of a total of sixty queued projects. ISO-NE, Interconnection Queue Request Queue
11-07-08, available at http://www.iso-
ne.com/genrtionresrcs/nwgen-inter/status/interconnection request-queue-%2011072008.xls.
8 Bruce W. Radford, The Queue Quandary, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2008, at 29.
9 Delays in PJM Queue Processing Scare Off New Capacity, Increase Costs, Says Complaint,
INSIDE FERC, Feb. 4, 2008, at 12 (citing delays by transmission provider PJM Interconnections in
processing an interconnection request by Dominion Resources Services).
10 See Craig S. Pirrong, Transaction Costs and the Organization of Coordination Activities in
Power Markets, in ELECTRIC CHOICES: DEREGULATION AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC POWER 113,
115-21 (Andrew N. Kleit ed., 2007) (discussing the problem of coordination and other technical
challenges faced by transmission providers); see also TURAN GONEN, MODERN POWER SYSTEM
ANALYSIS 13 (1988) (citing the impact of interconnections on generation and transmission planning).
Yale Journal on Regulation
navigate a much thornier policy environment that includes, among other issues,
the economic benefits or detriments of each particular transmission
investment-including those investments that are allocated to generator
interconnections. 11
Fortunately, or so it would seem, transmission planners are not completely
out to sea without a compass. Since 2003, generator interconnection procedures
and agreements have been governed by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's (FERC or the Commission) Order No. 2003, which established
standard interconnection procedures and agreements for transmission providers
interconnecting generators greater than 20 MW. 12 Uniform interconnection
procedures and agreements, FERC thought, would "minimize opportunities for
undue discrimination and expedite the development of new generation, while
protecting reliability and ensuring that rates are just and reasonable."' 3 FERC's
standardized interconnection procedures and agreements under Order No. 2003
were the end result of an extensive public rulemaking procedure, involving
input and collaboration from a broad range of industry and outside
stakeholders. Yet today, Order No. 2003 has become the focal point of
widespread criticism from project developers, transmission providers, and state
regulators for its perceived failure to allow timely interconnection and promote
the "relatively unencumbered entry"14 of new generation. 
15
Little more than five years since Order No. 2003 was issued, FERC is
once again reforming its generator interconnection policies in light of the
increasing concerns over interconnection queue management. The Commission
began its efforts at reform with a December 2007 technical conference to
address the issue of interconnection queue management and determine what
changes, if any, should be made to Order No. 2003.16 The oral testimony and
11 See Ross BALDICK ET AL., WORKING GROUP FOR INVESTMENT IN RELIABLE AND
ECONOMIC ELECTRIC SYSTEMS, A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON ALLOCATING THE COST OF
TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 9-10 (2007) (discussing the competing
objectives underlying transmission policy).
12 Order No. 2003, Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures,
68 Fed. Reg. 49,846 (Aug. 19, 2003) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 2003]. Since
issuing Order 2003, FERC has issued three more orders on rehearing. Order No. 2003-A,
Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,932 (Mar.
26, 2004) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 2003-A]; Order No. 2003-B,
Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 70 Fed. Reg. 265 (Jan. 4,
2005) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 2003-B]; Order No. 2003-C, Standardization of
Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,661 (June 30, 2005) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 2003-C]; see Nat'l Ass"n of Regulatory Util. Comm "rs v. FERC,
475 F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1468 (2008).
13 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,848, 11.
14 Id.
15 Market Participants Complain That FERC's Interconnection Rules Are Broken, FOSTER
ELEC. REP., Dec. 2007, at 6.
16 See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Technical Conference on Interconnection
Queuing Practices, AD08-2-000, F.E.R.C. Docket No. AD08-2-000 (statement of Chairman Joseph T.
Kelliher) (Dec. 1I, 2007), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket.search.asp (enter "AD08-
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subsequent written commentary provided by industry representatives indicated
widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo ante, but little consensus on the
way to proceed. 17 In a March 2008 follow-on order, FERC offered advice to
RTOs and ISOs on ways to streamline interconnection processing, but stopped
short of making any changes to Order No. 2003.18 Rather, FERC acknowledged
that regional differences between transmission providers warranted regional
approaches.' 9 To this end, the Commission instructed regional transmission
providers to propose their own variations of Order No. 2003 and provided
general guidance as to what types of solutions would likely be approved.
20
The Midwest ISO-the independent entity controlling grid access in the
Midwest-was the first to propose policy changes to FERC's pro forma
interconnection procedures, filing a queue reform proposal with the
Commission in June 2008, after an extensive nine-month stakeholder process.21
In its filing, the Midwest ISO proposed significant changes to the procedural
and substantive requirements of Order No. 2003, including increased fees for
queue entry, progress milestones for queue progression, and a fast-track
procedure for certain qualifying generation projects. In August 2008, the
Commission issued its conditional approval of the Midwest ISO's proposals,
indicating a significant course change in the agency's previous interconnection
queue policies.2 2
This Note examines FERC's interconnection policies under Order No.
2003, as well as the recently approved reforms proposed by the Midwest ISO.
It suggests additional reforms that should be pursued by FERC or other
regional transmission providers that would further increase efficiency in
processing interconnection queues. Part I of the Note begins by tracing the
development of FERC's interconnection policies and procedures within the
broader movement toward deregulated U.S. electricity markets and open-access
transmission policies. This Note then provides an overview of the procedural
2" into the "Docket Number" field, and then click on the documents with "Accession No.: 20071211-
3002").
17 See FERC Eyes Reform for Generator Interconnection, MEGAWATT DAILY, Dec. 12, 2007,
at 9. All commentary and testimony from FERC's December 11, 2007 Technical Conference on
Interconnection Queuing Practices can be accessed at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercadvsearch.asp under Docket No. AD08-2. Written
commentary from industry representatives and other stakeholders was generally filed on January 10,
2008.
18 Interconnection Queuing Practices, Docket No. AD08-2-000, Order on Technical
Conference, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,267, 18,269, [2008 Transfer Binder] 122 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep,
(CCH) 9 61,252, at 62,433-34, 99 10-12 (Mar. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Order on Technical Conference].
19 Id. at 62,433, 9 8.
20 Id. at 62,434-35, Ti 13, 16-18.
21 See Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator Inc. Submits Proposed Revisions
to Their Open Access Transmission and Energy Markets Tariff Under ER08-1169, F.E.R.C. Docket No.
ER08-1169-000 (June 6, 2008), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket-search.asp (enter
"ER08-1169" into the "Docket Number" field, and then click on the documents with "Filed Date:
6/26/2008") [hereinafter Midwest ISO Application].
22 Order Conditionally Accepting Tariff Revisions Addressing Queue Reform, 124 Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) T 61,183, 61,879 (Aug. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Midwest ISO
Approval Order].
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and substantive requirements of Order No. 2003, with a particular emphasis on
the important issue of cost allocation. Part II examines the difficulties of
managing regional interconnection queues under the provisions of Order No.
2003. In particular, this Note stresses the implications of Order No. 2003's
first-come, first-served queue priority policy and its insufficient requirements
for queue entry and maintenance of queue position. Part III analyzes and
evaluates the Midwest ISO's queue reform proposals and then proposes
additional queue reforms. As a long-term improvement, the Note recommends
expanding the authority and discretion provided to transmission providers in
deciding which generation projects should proceed to interconnection. The
Note argues that, by refining the financial and developmental milestones
adopted in the Midwest ISO plan, such increased authority could be achieved
while still limiting the opportunity for undue discrimination. As a short-term
improvement to interconnection queue management, the Note recommends
increasing the use of third-party consultants to conduct interconnection studies.
Part IV concludes.
I. FERC's Generator Interconnection Policies and Procedures
A. Development of Standardized Generator Interconnection Procedures
Although federal authority to mandate generator interconnection has
existed in varying degrees since the enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (PURPA)23 in 1978, standardized interconnection procedures are
only a recent development in the open-access regulatory framework.24 Prior to
PURPA, generator interconnection was primarily an internal affair-a single,
vertically integrated utility typically owned and operated both the
interconnecting generator and the transmission system, thereby obviating the
need for formal generator interconnection procedures and agreements.
25
PURPA, however, forced transmission providers to provide access to their
23 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (2006)). PURPA was the first major step toward today's open-access
transmission framework. The statute amended the Federal Power Act by adding section 210, a provision
that granted FERC the authority to compel electric utilities to provide transmission system
interconnection to a qualified applicant. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824i (2006); see RICHARD F.
HIRSH, POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN
ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 81-88 (1999).
24 Prior to PURPA, the Federal Power Commission (FPC), FERC's predecessor, had only
limited authority under the Federal Power Act (FPA) to force transmission system owners to
interconnect their transmission systems with unaffiliated entities. The FPC's authority to order
interconnection was limited to when "necessary or appropriate and in the public interest." 16 U.S.C. §
824(b) (2006). The FPC utilized this authority extensively during World War II, when it ordered
numerous temporary interconnections between utilities to maintain grid reliability for emergency
purposes. Richard S. Wirtz, Electric-Utility Interconnections: Power to the People, 21 STAN. L. REv.
1714, 1714-22 (1969). In the mid-1960s, as regional electricity networks were expanding in size, many
municipal utilities sought to invoke the FPA's section 202(b) interconnection authority to gain access to
cheaper public power or to enhance their competitiveness with private utilities. Id.
25 See PHILIPSON & WILLIS, supra note 6, at 12.
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transmission networks to unaffiliated "qualifying facilities"-mostly
cogenerating steam plants and small power plants using renewable resources.26
Transmission providers managed these interconnections by utilizing a wide
variety of procedures and contractual arrangements, ranging from formal
interconnection agreements to simple addenda attached to power purchase
27agreements. Even after the Energy Policy Act of 1992 broadened FERC's
authority to mandate generator interconnection, there was very little
standardization of interconnection procedures among transmission providers.
FERC continued to overlook generator interconnection in its landmark Order
No. 888, which laid the initial foundation for its open-access transmission
policies. 29 Although Order No. 888 required each transmission owner to file
basic terms and conditions regarding interconnection as part of its open access
transmission tariff (OATT), 30 it left the remaining details of interconnection to
the discretion of each transmission provider.
3 1
FERC's apparent neglect of interconnection issues in Order No. 888 was
perhaps due to the fact that, by the time Order No. 888 was drafted, the
Commission had already developed a substantial body of case law on generator
interconnection. Indeed, after PURPA was enacted, FERC's involvement in
generator interconnection issues increased dramatically with the surge of
qualifying facilities seeking interconnection during the 1980s and early
1990s.32 FERC initially treated these issues on a case-by-case basis by settling
disputes that arose between generator and transmission system owners over the
specific provisions of interconnection procedures and agreements.33 Cost
allocation was perhaps the most contentious issue in FERC's interconnection
hearings, as it was never entirely clear which parties benefitted the most from
the transmission upgrades or facilities required for interconnection and who
should pay their cost.34 The Commission ultimately developed a bifurcated
26 Joskow, supra note 1, at 102.
27 Jackie S. Levinson & Andrew D. Schifrin, Regulatory and Tax Treatment of Electric
Interconnection Facilities, 23 ENERGY L.J. 459, 467 (2002).
28 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 16, 38, and 42 U.S.C.). The Energy Policy Act removed the remaining barriers to
transmission access by granting FERC even greater authority to order any electric utility to provide
service to any power generator or wholesale buyer. PHILIPSON & WILLIS, supra note 6, at 24.
29 Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) [hereinafter Order No. 888].
30 The OATT is essentially a collection-electronic or published--of a transmission
provider's rate schedules for transmission services charged to transmission customers. Order No. 888
requires all transmission providers to make public their transmission charges in the form of the OATT.
Joskow, supra note 1, at 103.
31 Standardizing Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,140 (Nov. 1, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 ANPRM].
32 Approximately 60,000 MW of the U.S. generating capacity added between the 1980s and
early 1990s consisted of qualifying facilities. Joskow, supra note 1, at 102.
33 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,846, 49,848, 10 (Aug. 19, 2003).
34 Transmission system upgrades typically consist of physical equipment such as transmission
lines, transformers, switching devices, and power meters. In addition, upgrades might also require an
extensive site preparation, including the purchase of land for siting equipment or easements.
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approach to cost allocation, whereby transmission upgrades for generator
interconnection were divided between two categories: "interconnection
facilities" and "network upgrades." 35 Because the benefits of interconnection
facilities were assumed to accrue to generator owners, the owners were deemed
responsible for those costs. Network upgrades, on the other hand, were those
upgrades necessary to maintain the overall reliability and stability of the grid
given the additional power input of the proposed generator. The generator
owner was required to pay the up-front cost of network upgrades; however,
because these upgrades benefitted the entire network, their costs were
ultimately reimbursed in the form of credits against transmission charges.
As for transmission service charges, FERC established a "higher of'
pricing policy for transmission owners who also owned and operated
generation facilities (non-independent transmission owners). Under this policy,
non-independent transmission owners had the option of charging unaffiliated
generators a transmission rate that was the higher of either: (1) the incremental
cost rate of the network upgrades required for interconnection; or (2) an
embedded (or "rolled in") cost rate36 for the entire transmission system,
including the cost of network upgrades. 37 The rationale for this pricing policy
was to protect the existing transmission system subscribers and native load
customers from effectively subsidizing an unaffiliated generator's network
upgrades. 38 Accordingly, where the costs of network upgrades exceeded the
benefits to existing subscribers and native load customers, the transmission
provider had the option of charging the incremental cost rate to the generator.
Although FERC's case law established a relatively clear policy on cost
allocation for interconnection-related upgrades, both generation owners and
transmission providers still faced considerable uncertainty with respect to the
more detailed aspects of the interconnection process. The variance in
interconnection procedures and standards among transmission providers
increased the commercial risk faced by independent generation developers. 39 In
35 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,849, 21. Under previous FERC case law, the dividing
line between interconnection facilities and network upgrades was the point of connection to the
transmission system. Any upgrades that were installed between the generating unit and the
interconnection point were classified as interconnection facilities. By contrast, any upgrades installed
beyond the interconnection point were classified as network upgrades. Id.
36 The incremental cost rate is roughly calculated by dividing the costs of network upgrades
required for interconnection by the estimated transmission usage of the interconnected generator. In
contrast, the embedded cost rate is calculated by dividing the aggregate transmission system costs
(including the network upgrade of the interconnected generator) by the aggregate transmission system
usage (including the additional usage of the interconnected generator). Order No. 2003-A, 69 Fed. Reg.
15,932, 15,979-80, 1581 (Mar. 26, 2004).
37 FERC's "higher of" pricing policy was established in Northeast Utilities Service Co., 58
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,070 (1992), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub noma.
Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937 (1st Cir. 1993). See also Pa. Elec. Co., 58 Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,278, affd sub nom. Pa. Elec. Co. v. FERC, II F.3d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
38 Order 2003-A, 69 Fed. Reg. at 15,979, 580.
39 See 2001 ANPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,140, 55,141 (Nov. 1, 2001) ("[T]he Commission
recognizes that there is still dissatisfaction and uncertainty with existing interconnection policy and
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addition, there was widespread belief among unaffiliated generator owners that
transmission system owners were using interconnection policies and
procedures to discriminate against unaffiliated generators. 40 For their part,
transmission system owners generally argued that their interconnection
procedures and policies were necessary to ensure that only viable projects
remained in the queue and that native load customers were not paying for
upgrades that benefitted only the unaffiliated generator.41 And, as the number
of generator owners seeking access to the grid increased significantly after
Order No. 888, so too did the frequency of interconnection disputes between
generator owners and transmission providers.
42
In October 2001, FERC took its first step toward remedying this situation
by issuing an advanced notice of Froposed rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking
industry comment on a standardized interconnection procedure and agreement
modeled on those used by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).
43
After gathering industry comments on the proposed new rules, FERC then
began a highly collaborative process of drafting and revising its standardized
interconnection procedures and agreement, drawing on the expertise and
viewpoints of power generators, transmission providers, state utility regulators,
and the public. 44 In 2002, FERC published the result of this process in a notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) and requested further comment.45 After
further drafting and revising, in July 2003, FERC released its final pro forma
standardized interconnection procedures and agreement under Order No.
2003. 46
Despite its extensive effort to build a broad consensus on the provisions of
its pro forma interconnection procedures and agreement, no sooner had FERC
issued Order No. 2003 than it was swamped with petitions for rehearing and
clarification. 47 Accordingly, in 2004, FERC issued two more orders on
rehearing: Order No. 2003-A in March 2004,48 and Order No. 2003-B in
procedures that may have resulted in less investment in infrastructure and less confidence in the
competitiveness ofthe markets.").
40 See id. (citing complaints of unaffiliated generator owners that included unequal treatment
by transmission system owners toward unaffiliated generators and lack of certainty in upgrade costs
charged to unaffiliated generators).
41 Id. (citing transmission providers' needs for interconnection procedures and policies as: (1)
weeding out those interconnection customers who will likely never interconnect; (2) assuring the control
area will benefit from the added generation; and (3) improving coordination between generators and
load).
42 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,846, 49,848, 10 (Aug. 19, 2003).
43 2001 ANPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,140. The ERCOT interconnection procedures and
agreement were modified to reflect "best practices" that had been developed under the FERC case law.
Id. at 55,141.
44 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,848, 14; see JAMES H. MCGREW, FERC: FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 182 (2003).
45 Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (May 2, 2002).
46 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,846.
47 See Report of the Electric Utility Regulation Committee, 26 ENERGY L.J. 217, 237 (2005).
48 Order No. 2003-A, 69 Fed. Reg. 15, 932 (Mar. 26, 2004).
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December 2004. 49 In general, both Order No. 2003-A and Order No. 2003-B
revised and clarified the rules for allocating costs incurred for any network
improvements required to interconnect a generator.50  FERC revisited its
interconnection policies again in 2005, issuing Order No. 2003-C on rehearing
to reaffirm and clarify its pricing policies for network improvements. 5 1 Most
recently, in January 2007, the D.C. Circuit upheld FERC's Order No. 2003 and
all orders on rehearing under a challenge brought by four utilities and six state
regulatory agencies, together with the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners (NARUC).52
B. Overview of FERC Order No. 2003
1. Objectives and Priorities
The stated objectives of Order No. 2003 are to "minimize the opportunity
for undue discrimination and expedite the development of new generation
while protecting reliability and ensuring that rates are just and reasonable." 53
To achieve these goals, Order No. 2003 promulgates the pro forma Large
Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP) and Large Generator
Interconnection Agreements (LGIA)-standardized interconnection procedures
and agreements that each ,jurisdictional54 transmission provider is required to
adopt as part of its OATT. By ensuring that all transmission providers employ
49 Order No. 2003-B, 70 Fed. Reg. 265 (Jan. 4, 2005).
50 See, e.g., Brownell Predicts that Changes to Generation Interconnection Rule Will Create
Unnecessary Financial Uncertainty, FOSTER ELEC. REP., Jan. 2005, at 4 (summarizing Order No. 2003-
B provisions); Revised Generator Interconnection Rule Pleases Neither Generators nor Transmission
Owners, FOSTER ELEC. REP., Apr. 2004, at 3 (summarizing Order No. 2003-A provisions). FERC also
included in Order No. 2003-A two exemptions from the standardized interconnection requirements for
wind power generators, recognizing that wind generators' "unique electrical characteristics" warranted a
"slightly different approach." Order No. 2003-A, 69 Fed. Reg. at 15,963 n.85. For specific exemptions,
see id. at 15,935, 29, 34.
51 Order No. 2003-C, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,661 (June 30, 2005); see FERC Affirms and Clarifies
Its Large Generator Interconnection Rule, FOSTER ELEC. REP., June 2005, at 6.
52 Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm 'rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1468 (2008).
53 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,846, 49,848, II (Aug. 19, 2003).
54 Under the FPA, FERC has jurisdiction over all transmission facilities providing interstate
transmission service. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006). FERC normally has no jurisdiction over distribution
facilities (e.g., power lines for local distribution to homes and businesses). However, for the purpose of
Order No. 2003, the Commission has claimed jurisdiction over distribution facilities that are also used to
interconnect generators for the purpose of wholesale power sales. See Order No. 2003-A, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 15,933.
55 The LGIP, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,933 (Aug. 19, 2003), establish the procedural requirements for
generator interconnection, whereas the LGIA, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,949 (Aug. 19, 2003), delineate the
substantive rights and responsibilities of each party. As such, the LGIA contemplate and address a broad
range of contingencies that arise in the generator interconnection process. The LGIP are included as
Appendix C to Order 2003, while the LGIA are included in the LGIP as Appendix 6. Order No. 2003,
68 Fed. Reg. at 49,847. The current LGIP and LGIA reflecting all revisions can be accessed at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electriclindus-act/gi/stnd-gen.asp. Hereinafter, specific provisions of the
LGIP and LGIA will be cited in reference to the applicable section of the LGIP or article of the LGIA.
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the same interconnection procedures and standards for all generators seeking
interconnection, Order No. 2003 limits the ability of non-independent
transmission providers to use the interconnection process as a tool to
discriminate against unaffiliated generators. With greater ease in accessing the
transmission network, more generators can connect to the grid, which increases
the overall supply of electricity, thereby resulting in decreased prices and
increased reliability for consumers.
In drafting Order No. 2003, FERC placed a considerably high premium on
flexibility-for both transmission providers as well as interconnection
customers. For example, although Order No. 2003 mandates the adoption of the
pro forma LGIP and LGIA, it also allows deviations from the standard
provisions, thereby seeking "a reasonable balance between... uniformity and
flexibility." 56 Where the transmission provider is a non-independent entity,
57
Order No. 2003 allows deviations that are justified under either a "regional
differences" or a "consistent with or superior to" standard.58 On the other hand,
if the transmission provider is an independent entity-that is, an RTO or ISO-
the order allows much more leeway in modifying the LGIP and LGIA. To a
limited extent, independent transmission providers can adjust the terms,
conditions, and pricing of the pro forma procedures and the agreement to
accommodate specific aspects of their particular region. Although such
modifications must be approved by FERC prior to their adoption by the
transmission provider, thea' need meet only a much less rigid "independent
entity variation" standard.
Along with the flexibility afforded transmission providers, Order No.
2003 also provides significant flexibility to the interconnection customer. First,
an interconnection customer may withdraw its interconnection request at any
56 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,846, 7.
57 See supra note 6.
58 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,850, 26. The "regional differences" and "consistent
with or superior to" standards were first developed by FERC in Order No. 888 as a means to allow
transmission providers to deviate from specific provisions of the pro forma OATT. Order No. 888, 61
Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,619 (May 10, 1996). The "regional differences" standard allowed transmission
providers to adopt changes to the pro forma OATT that captured regional practices that were
"reasonable, generally accepted in the region, and consistently adhered to by the transmission provider
(e.g., time deadlines for scheduling changes, time deadlines for determining available capacity)." Id.
Deviations from the pro forma OATT based on the regional differences standard were permitted within
the first sixty days following the issuance of the final rule under Order No. 888. Id. After this period,
FERC was considerably less flexible in allowing deviations from the pro forma tariff in that it permitted
alterations only where such changes were "consistent with, or superior to" those called for by the pro
forma tariff. Id. In Order No. 2003-A, FERC clarified that the "regional difference" standard would be
applicable only where a non-independent transmission provider sought a variation that was necessary to
meet established reliability requirements. Order No. 2003-A, 69 Fed. Reg. 15, 932, 15,999, 756 (Mar.
26, 2004). For any other variations, the non-independent transmission provider is required to meet the
"consistent with or superior to" standard. Id.
59 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,983, 827. Under the "independent entity standard,"
the Commission "recognizes that an RTO or ISO has different operating characteristics depending on its
size and location and is less likely to act in an unduly discriminatory manner than a [t]ransmission
[p]rovider that is a market participant." Id. The "RTO or ISO shall therefore have greater flexibility to
customize its interconnection procedures and agreements to fit regional needs." Id.
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time during the interconnection process with little more than written notice to
the transmission provider.60 When an interconnection customer withdraws, it
forfeits its queue position and must pay the transmission provider all costs
"prudently incur[red]" with respect to the interconnection request. Second, an
interconnection customer may suspend construction and installation of
interconnection facilities or network upg rades for up to three years after
executing an interconnection agreement. Upon suspending its project, the
customer is responsible for only (1) the costs incurred by the transmission
provider prior to the suspension; and (2) any costs the transmission provider
63incurs by suspending the interconnection project. Last, an interconnection
customer is permitted to modify its interconnection request-including the
technical parameters of both its power generator and interconnection
facilities-at any time during the interconnection study process.64 For example,
the LGIP allow interconnection customers significant flexibility to modify,
suspend, or withdraw their interconnection request with little consequence. The
customer is, however, limited in its ability to change the electric power output
of its proposed generator-it may not increase the proposed output, and it has
only limited ability to decrease the proposed output of the project. 65 These
policies and their implications for queue management will be discussed in Part
II.
2. Procedural and Substantive Requirements
Viewed from a distance, generator interconnection under Order No. 2003
seems relatively straightforward. The interconnection procedure begins when a
, ,,66
prospective generator developer-the "interconnection customer" -submits a
valid interconnection request to the transmission provider along with a $10,000
deposit and a demonstration of site control. 67 The transmission provider then
60 LGIP, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,933, 49,938, § 3.6 (Aug. 19, 2003). An interconnection request may
also be deemed withdrawn by the transmission provider if the interconnection customer does not adhere
to the provisions of the LGIP. Id.
61 Id.
62 LGIA, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,949, 49,958, art. 5.16 (Aug. 19, 2003).
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., LGIP, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,939, §§ 4.4.1-.3.
65 Prior to the system impact study, the interconnection customer may decrease its proposed
electric power output by up to sixty percent. Id. at 49,939, § 4.4.1. Prior to the facilities study, the
interconnection customer may decrease its proposed electrical output an additional fifteen percent. Id. at
49,939, § 4.4.2. If the interconnection customer wishes to increase its proposed electric power output,
the incremental power increase will be placed at the end of the queue for cost allocation and
interconnection analyses. Id. at 49,939, § 4.4.1.
66 Id. at 49,934, § 1. The interconnection customer can also be the transmission provider,
transmission owner, or any of the affiliates or subsidiaries of either, that proposes to interconnect a
generating facility with the transmission provider's transmission system. Id.
67 Id. at 49,937, § 3.3.1. Site control can be demonstrated by any of the following: (1) holding
a leasehold interest or right to develop a site for the purpose of constructing a power generator; (2) an
option to purchase or acquire a leasehold site for such purpose; or (3) an exclusivity or other business
relationship between the interconnection customer and the seller/owner of the site property. Id. at
49,934, § 1. In lieu of demonstrating site control, the interconnection customer can instead post an
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assigns the interconnection customer a queue position based on the date and
time the interconnection request was submitted. Upon establishment of queue
priority, the transmission provider commences an in-depth interconnection
study process composed of three separate analyses: a feasibility study, a system
impact study, and a facilities study.68 The interconnection customer is
responsible for all costs associated with interconnection studies and must post
nominal deposits prior to the commencement of each study.
69
All interconnection studies are performed separately and sequentially,
beginning with the feasibility study and ending with the facilities study. The
feasibility study is the most basic of the studies and comprises a reality check
to ensure the proposed interconnection is reasonable from engineering and
economic perspectives. By comparison, the system impact and facilities studies
are much more rigorous engineering and cost evaluations of the requirements
for interconnection. All interconnection requests are studied serially based on
queue priority, but the LGIP allow the transmission provider to perform the
system impact study on multiple interconnection requests simultaneously in
''clusters."'
After completion of the interconnection studies, the transmission provider
and interconnection customer then negotiate any remaining transaction-specific
provisions, such as construction milestones and other interconnection details. 71
Once an agreement has been reached between the parties, the interconnection
agreement is filed and executed. Thereupon, the interconnection customer and
transmission provider may begin construction activities on the interconnection
in accordance with the terms agreed upon in the LGIA.
72
3. Interconnection Cost Allocation
In drafting the pro forma LGIP and LGIA under Order No. 2003, FERC
incorporated much of its previous case law regarding generator
additional $10,000 deposit that is refundable if the interconnection customer later demonstrates site
control. Id. at 49,937, § 3.3.1.
68 Id. at 49,939-41, §§ 6-8. The LGIP also list a fourth test-the optional interconnection
study. This study is performed for informational purposes at the request of the interconnection customer.
Id. at 49,942, § 10.1. An interconnection customer might request an optional interconnection study in
order to evaluate an alternate interconnection point.
69 Id. at 49,944, § 13.3. The required deposit amounts for the feasibility study and system
impact study are $10,000 and $50,000, respectively. Id. at 49,939-40, §§ 6.1, 7.2. Prior to the facilities
study, the interconnection customer must deposit the greater of $100,000 or the estimated monthly cost
of the study. Id. at 49,941, § 8.1.
70 Id. at 49,938, § 4.2. A transmission provider may also group all interconnection requests
within a timeframe or "queue cluster window" of one hundred eighty calendar days. Id. While the LGIP
do not explicitly state how clusters should be formed, in Order No. 2003 FERC indicated that clusters
should be constituted on the basis of both queue position and electrical location. Order No. 2003, 68
Fed. Reg. 49,846, 49,861, 156 (Aug. 19, 2003).
71 LGIP, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,942, § 11.2; see LGIA, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,949, 49,972 apps. A-F
(Aug. 19, 2003).
72 LGIP, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,942, § 11.4. These provisions are contained in the appendices of
the pro forma LGIA. LGIA, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,972 apps. A-F.
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interconnection.73 Most importantly, FERC continued its bifurcated approach
to allocating the cost of interconnection-related upgrades. Interconnection
customers remain responsible for the up-front costs of both interconnection
facilities as well as network upgrades; however, the transmission provider must
ultimately reimburse the cost of network upgrades, first through transmission
service credits and then in a final balloon payment of any costs that are not
reimbursed after twenty years.74 In addition, FERC continued its "higher of'
pricing policy with respect to transmission service charges.
75
Consistent with its underlying policy of providing flexibility to
transmission providers and interconnection customers, Order No. 2003 permits
independent transmission providers to deviate from the pro forma cost
allocation scheme. In the order, the Commission recognized that allowing an
interconnection customer to recover the full costs of network upgrades over
time would mute much of the "incentive to make an efficient siting decision
that takes new transmission costs into account," 76 and where the generator
ultimately sold its output to off-system customers, such recovery would amount
to an unfair subsidy. Accordingly, in Order No. 2003, the Commission
permitted independent transmission providers to adopt "participant funding"
wherein the interconnection customer "bears the cost of all facilities and
upgrades that would not be needed but for the interconnection of the new
[g]enerating [f]acility."
77
II. The Challenges of Queue Management Under Order No. 2003
A. Symptoms
FERC issued Order No. 2003 with the s ecific goal of remedying the
prevalent delays in the interconnection process. However, based on the oral
testimony and written commentary arising from FERC's December 2007
technical conference on queue management issues, interconnection delays have
actually worsened since the issuance of Order No. 2003. The evidence and
experiences shared by regional transmission planners, project developers, and
state utility regulators depict an exasperating state of affairs in managing
interconnection queues under FERC's standardized procedures. For example, at
the time of FERC's technical conference, the Midwest ISO's queue contained
73 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,849, 21.
74 LGIA, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,964, art. 11.4.1.
75 Order No. 2003-C, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,661 (June 30, 2005). FERC has long viewed the up-
front payments for network upgrades as a loan from the interconnection customer to the transmission
provider. Id. at 37,662 n.9.
76 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,903, 695.
77 Id.
78 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,848, 11.
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over 73,000 MW7 9 of prospective generation projects awaiting interconnection,
of which over 57,000 MW were comprised of wind power projects.80 It has
been estimated that the Midwest ISO interconnection queue would require
anywhere from forty to three hundred years to process these requests under the
current interconnection procedures. 81 Interconnection queues in other regions
appeared similar to that of the Midwest ISO. In the California ISO, for
example, there were 57,000 MW of active interconnection requests, which
included approximately 40,000 MW of renewable energy technologies.
82
Contributing to the growing interconnection queue backlogs is the
increasing frequency of delays in processing interconnection studies. As one
example, power developer Dominion Resources Services (Dominion) cited a
feasibility study that was completed nearly three months late as well as a
follow-on system impact study that was an estimated three to six months
behind schedule. 83 Along with Dominion, several other power developers have
expressed their frustration with delayed interconnection studies.84 Moreover, in
regions that have implemented forward capacity markets,8 5  delays in
completing interconnection studies are causing even greater complications.
Power developers seeking to participate in forward capacity markets are either
79 Interconnection queue size is typically measured in terms of the overall power capacity
awaiting connection rather than the number of projects awaiting connection.
80 Comments on Filing of ISO/RTO Council (ISO/Regional Trans. Org. Council) Under
AD08-2, F.E.R.C. Docket No. AD08-2-000, at 6 (Jan. 10, 2008), available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket-search.asp (enter "AD08-2" into the "Docket Number" field, and
then click on the documents with "Accession No.: 20080110-5085") [hereinafter Comments of the
ISO/RTO Council].
81 Radford, supra note 8, at 28.
82 Comments of the ISO/RTO Council, supra note 80, at 6.
83 Post-Technical Comments of Dominion Resources Services., Inc. under AD08-2, F.E.R.C.
Docket No. AD08-2-000, at 5 (Jan. 10, 2008), available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket search.asp (enter "AD08-2" into the "Docket Number" field, and
then click on the documents with "Accession No.: 20080110-5078") [hereinafter Post-Technical
Conference Comments of Dominion Resource Services].
84 See, e.g., American Wind Energy Association Comment Under AD08-2-000 in Support of
RTO/ISO Areas and in Opposition to Participant Funding, F.E.R.C. Docket No. AD08-2-000 (Jan. 10,
2008), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket_search.asp (enter "AD08-2" into the "Docket
Number" field, and then click on the documents with "Accession No.: 20080110-5020") [hereinafter
Comments of the American Wind Energy Association] (noting the delays in processing interconnection
studies); Post-Technical Conference Comments of LS Power Associates, L.P., in Docket AD08-2,
F.E.R.C. Docket No. AD08-2-000, at 5 (Jan. 10, 2008), available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket search.asp (enter "AD08-2" into the "Docket Number" field, and
then click on the documents with "Accession No.: 20080110-4005") ("[T]he problem is that studies
required by the LGIP are not completed in accordance with the deadlines set forth in the LGIP.").
85 To maintain network reliability, all transmission providers must make arrangements with
power generators-affiliated or unaffiliated-to provide reserve or backup generating capacity to ensure
overall system reliability. In regions that have adopted competitive wholesale electricity markets,
forward capacity markets (FCM) are a recent innovation being adopted in several regions to establish
the price that a power generator will be paid for providing capacity at a future date. In general, in a
FCM, generators "bid" their capacity into an auction-type market, and, if their bid clears, they enter an
agreement to provide capacity at a future date. See Peter Cramton & Steven Stoll, Ctr. for Energy and
Envtl. Policy Research, The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity with
Special Attention to the CAISO's Resource Adequacy Problem 15-19 (Apr. 25, 2006) (unpublished
working paper), available at http://stoft.com/p/7l .html.
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not permitted to bid their capacity without the results of an interconnection
study or are unwilling to incur the commercial risk of entering a forward
capacity agreement without an estimate of the interconnection costs.
86
B. Queue Priority: Implications for Cost Allocation and Interconnection Re-
studies
Perhaps the most fundamental-and problematic-aspect of
interconnection queue management under Order No. 2003 is its first-come,
first-served paradigm for assigning queue priority. Although the presumable
rationale for this policy is to ensure non-discriminatory treatment in
establishing queue priority, this mechanism has serious implications for the
interconnection study process as well as the allocation of costs for
interconnection upgrades. In both cases, transmission providers must assume
that the queue is static and all higher-queued customers have been integrated
into the grid. However, in practice, the queue is anything but static, as any
interconnection customer may either withdraw or suspend an interconnection
request. Although an interconnection customer may modify its interconnection
request after entering the queue, the effect of such modifications on the queue
is limited in that only non-material modifications are permitted. Any
modification to an interconnection request that is deemed material is permitted
only if the interconnection customer forfeits its queue position.
87
1. Cost Allocation Implications
Intuitively, the withdrawal of higher-queued interconnection customers
would seem beneficial to interconnection customers of lower priority who are
then able to advance in the queue. But the withdrawal or even the suspension of
a higher-queued project can, in fact, carry serious financial consequences for
lower-queued interconnection customers. Under the cost allocation policy of
Order No. 2003, the full up-front costs of network upgrades are allocated to the
first interconnection customer requiring such upgrades for interconnection-a
"first-come, first-pay" paradigm. For purposes of cost allocation and
interconnection analysis for all succeeding interconnection customers, the
transmission provider will assume that all higher-queued network upgrades
have already been integrated into the grid. Lower-queued interconnection
customers negotiating and executing interconnection agreements on this
assumption are therefore subject to the commercial risk of later having to pay
the up-front cost of network upgrades left unfunded by a higher-queued
86 Post-Technical Conference Comments of Dominion Resource Services, Inc., supra note
83, at 4-7 (commenting on Dominion's inability to participate in PJM Interconnection's Base Rate
Auction (FCM) due to PJM Interconnection's delay in processing an interconnection study).
87 LGIP, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,933, 49,939, § 4.4.3 (Aug. 19, 2003). The LGIP do not define
precisely what constitutes a material modification, but rather leave the transmission provider the task of
making this determination on a "reasonable basis." Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,846, 49,862, ' 168
(Aug. 19, 2003).
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customer that withdraws its project from the queue. If a higher-queued
interconnection customer suspends construction or installation of a network
upgrade, any lower-queued interconnection customer entering an
interconnection agreement in reliance on the suspended network upgrades
again faces considerable commercial uncertainty, since it has no basis to
determine if and when the network upgrades will actually be funded.
In adopting its final rule under Order No. 2003, FERC acknowledged the
commercial risk imposed on lower-queued interconnection customers by its
suspension and withdrawal policy. 8 However, the Commission reasoned that
all interconnection customers would benefit from the added flexibility and
could mitigate their commercial risk by including such contingencies in their
negotiations with transmission providers over the interconnection agreement.
89
If such contingencies were not accounted for in the interconnection agreement,
the Commission was less helpful, as it would simply "leave it to the [lower-
queued] Interconnection Customer and the Transmission Provider to revisit the
negotiated terms of their executed Interconnection Agreement."
90
2. Interconnection Re-studies
Even where the withdrawal or suspension of a higher-queued project does
not reallocate network upgrade costs to a lower-queued interconnection
customer, the change can still have a financial impact on lower-queued projects
because of the delays caused by interconnection re-studies. Since
interconnection studies assume that all higher-queued projects have been
integrated along with any network upgrades required for interconnection, any
change in this assumption-namely, a higher-queued project that either drops
out of the queue or otherwise modifies its interconnection request-requires an
interconnection re-study.9 1 Although such re-studies are driven by the actions
of higher-queued interconnection customers, the lower-queued projects bear
the resulting costs and delays. In some cases, delays caused by re-studies can
have even greater implications for project viability, as when an interconnection
customer's lenders are unwilling to finance a project without an
interconnection agreement. 92 Although FERC acknowledged that its liberal
withdrawal policy might have a negative impact on lower-queued customers, it
again decided in favor of flexibility, reasoning that lower-queued customers
would actually benefit from "the flexibility to request that the Transmission
Provider study a substitute Point of Interconnection."
93
88 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,881, 409.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 LGIP, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,938-41, §§ 4.4, 6.4, 7.6, 8.5.
92 See Neptune Tells FERC That PJM's Restudy Demands Are Putting Transmission Project
"'In Grave Jeopardy," FOSTER ELEC. REP., Jan. 2005, at 13 (citing the inability of a merchant
transmission company to obtain financing for a transmission project due to delays in obtaining an
interconnection agreement caused by interconnection re-studies).
93 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. at 49,867, 222.
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III. Improving Interconnection Queue Management Under Order No. 2003
A. FERC Guidance
Since the Commission's 2007 Technical Conference, the industry has
taken significant steps toward improving interconnection queue management
through regional stakeholder processes.9 These efforts have been guided by
FERC's March 2008 Conference Order, in which the Commission suggested
three types of reforms to regional interconnection procedures that would likely
gain approval. First, the Commission acknowledged that the requirements for
obtaining and maintaining queue position were insufficient to prevent
premature or unviable projects from entering the queue.95 As one possible
means of strengthening these requirements, FERC suggested increasing the
amount of monetary deposits required at each stage of the interconnection
process.96 Second, the Commission recommended eliminating the feasibility
study as a separate step in the interconnection process, reasoning that as long as
interconnection customers have sufficient means to gather information
regarding prospective interconnection sites, the feasibility study adds
unnecessary delays to the interconnection process.97 FERC also acknowledged
that removing the feasibility study would increase the cost of queue entry, as
the initial deposit would reflect the higher price of the system impact study as
opposed to the lower cost of the feasibility study. Last, and perhaps most
important, FERC suggested that "there may be approaches to prioritizing queue
processing that provide protection against discrimination comparable to the
first come, first served approach, but that are more efficient,"99 thereby creating
an opening for transmission planners to shift to a "first-ready, first-served"
approach to establishing queue priority.
FERC's follow-on order left many questions unanswered regarding the
extent to which regional planners could stray from Order No. 2003 in crafting
regional reforms. For example, where FERC would draw the line on increased
deposits remained uncertain, as did the extent to which developmental or
94 Even before FERC's 2007 Technical Conference, several ISOs had already initiated
stakeholder processes to develop solutions to interconnection queue backlogs. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA
ISO, GENERATION INTERCONNECTION REFORM INITIATIVE, ISSUES IDENTIFICATION PAPER (2008),
available at http://www.caiso.com/lf42/lf42c00d28c30.html; MIDWEST ISO, PROPOSAL TO REVISE
GENERATOR INTERCONNECTION PROCEDURES 3 (2008), available at
http://www.midwestmarket.org/publish/Document/1 d6630_I1 a6da4545e_-7cba0a48324a?rev-l;
Memorandum from Stephen Rourke, Vice President of Sys. Planning, ISO New England, et al., to New
England Conference of Public Utils. Comm'rs (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.iso-
ne.com/committees/commwkgrps/othr/fcm-gen/mtrls/sep272007/index.html.
95 Order on Technical Conference, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,267, 18,269-70, 15 (Apr. 3, 2008).
96 Id. at 18,270, 16.
97 Id. 17.
98 Id. ("Elimination of a separate feasibility study could streamline the study process and
could reduce interconnection requests by screening out those customers who are not willing to pay the
higher deposit required for a system impact study.").
99 Id. T18.
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financial milestones could be used to establish or maintain queue priority.
Moreover, in shifting to a seemingly subjective "first-ready" standard, it was
difficult to say how regional transmission planners determine that a project was
"first-ready" with respect to others in the queue. Fortunately, FERC provided
clarity to these issues in an August 2008 order that conditionally approved an
interconnection queue reform proposal submitted by the Midwest ISO in June
2008. l ° ° The approved Midwest ISO plan departs significantly from the pro
forma procedures under Order No. 2003, both procedurally and substantively.
In that the Midwest ISO reform proposals have gained FERC approval, it is
likely that they will be highly influential in any subsequent regional reform
initiatives that follow.
B. Midwest ISO Reform
On a procedural level, the Midwest ISO plan diverges from Order No.
2003 by dividing and arranging the pro forma interconnection process into four
separate phases: a newly created Pre-Queue Phase, an Application Review
Phase, a System Planning and Analysis Phase, and a final Definitive Planning
Phase. 10 1 During the Pre-Queue Phase, prospective interconnection customers
must first meet with Midwest ISO transmission providers in an informational
session to discuss their interconnection request proposal prior to actually
submitting an application or paying any deposits. The Midwest ISO added
this additional phase to reduce non-viable or speculative interconnection
requests by providing realistic expectations with respect to the potential for
success of interconnection requests. 10 3 The System Planning and Analysis
Phase is simply the System Impact Study Phase from Order No. 2003, whereas
the Definitive Planning Stage consists of an additional system impact study as
well as a study similar to the facilities study of Order No. 2003.104
The Application Review Phase is comprised primarily of the same
feasibility study as used under Order No. 2003.105 However, rather than serving
merely as an informative evaluation, the feasibility study under the Midwest
ISO plan performs a much more qualitative function in that it determines
whether a project is eligible for special "fast-track" treatment. Under this newly
adopted feature, an interconnection customer may skip ahead of other higher-
100 Midwest ISO Approval Order, 124 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,183,
61,879 (Aug. 25, 2008).
101 Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator Inc. Submits Proposed Revisions to
Their Open Access Transmission and Energy Markets Tariff Under ER08-1169, F.E.R.C. Docket No.
ER08-1169-000, at 3-4 (June 30, 2008), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket-search.asp
(enter "ER08-1169" into the "Docket Number" field, and then click on the documents with "Accession
No. 20080630-0024") [hereinafter Midwest ISO Amendment Filing].
102 Midwest ISO Approval Order, 124 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at 61,883,
32.
103 Id. at 61,880, 5.
104 Midwest ISO Amendment Filing, supra note 101, at 4-5.
105 Midwest ISO Application, supra note 21, at 4.
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queued projects by foregoing the System Planning and Analysis Phase entirely,
and proceeding directly to the Definitive Planning Phase. 1 6 Qualification for
the fast track depends on the readiness of the generation project to proceed and
the complexity of the interconnection as determined by the feasibility study.1
0 7
Along with the fast-track provision, the Midwest ISO plan also attempts
to accelerate generator interconnection by creating a new "temporary
interconnection" service that allows generation developers to take advantage of
existing transmission capacity without paying for necessary network
upgrades.10 8 Under this service, a developer is permitted to interconnect to the
grid; its output, however, is restricted to a seasonally adjusted operational limit
based on the available transmission capacity. Accordingly, temporary
interconnection would bear the financial risk that future operational limits
could render the project commercially unviable.
Substantive changes to the pro forma procedure are designed largely to
ensure that only commercially viable projects enter the queue and that, once in
the queue, projects continue to make progress toward an interconnection
agreement. Most importantly, the first-come, first-served queue priority rule of
Order No. 2003 is mostly scrapped under the Midwest ISO plan. Aside from
allowing qualifying interconnection projects to skip the System Planning and
Analysis Phase under the fast-track option, the Midwest ISO plan also allows
interconnection projects to advance toward interconnection based on a series of
technical and financial readiness milestones. 10 9 For example, before the
Facilities Study in the Definitive Planning Stage, the interconnection customer
must meet one of the following requirements: (1) obtain a power purchase
agreement or become designated as a network resource; (2) provide the
transmission provider reasonable security for the cost of necessary network
upgrades; or (3) demonstrate that generator turbines have been ordered for the
proposed project. 110
In addition to readiness milestones, the Midwest ISO plan also increases
the cost of entering and remaining in the queue through increased study
deposits and a more rigid suspension policy. Where Order No. 2003 calls for a
$10,000 deposit to enter the queue, the Midwest ISO plan requires not only an
initial $5000 application fee, but also an additional study deposit that ranges
from $10,000 to $120,000, depending on the size of the generator. 1 ] The plan
106 Midwest ISO Approval Order, 124 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at 61,883,
38.
107 Midwest ISO Amendment Filing, supra note 101, at 4.
108 Midwest ISO Approval Order, 124 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at 61,896,
124.
109 Midwest ISO Amendment Filing, supra note 101, at 13-16.
110 Id. at 15 n.53.
III Midwest ISO, Attachment X: Generator Interconnection Procedures, § 3.3.1 (June 26,
2008), available at http://www.midwestmarket.org/publish/Document/25 fta7_II c1 022c619_-
7d600a48324a [hereinafter Midwest ISO Interconnection Procedure]. For generators less than 6 MW,
the Midwest ISO plan calls for a $10,000 study deposit, whereas a 100 MW generator requires a
$120,000 deposit. Id.
Vol. 26:1, 2009
Reforming Interconnection Queue Management
requires a similar sliding study deposit before an interconnection customer
enters the Definitive Planning Stage. Along with higher queue entry fees, the
Midwest ISO plan also raises the cost of suspending an interconnection request
by allowing suspension only for force majeure reasons and requiring the
customer to provide additional security to pay for the cost of network upgrades
that would have been required for the interconnection project.'" 3
C. Evaluating the Midwest ISO Plan
Transmission planners face no easy task in improving interconnection
queue management given the number and disparity of stakeholders involved, as
well as the constraints imposed by FERC under Order No. 2003. The Midwest
ISO plan itself was the result of an extensive stakeholder process involving
over twenty-nine separate organizations meeting on more than fifteen
occasions over the course of nine months." 4 Perhaps most amazing was that
any consensus was actually reached among so many competing interests. And,
although it is uncertain that the Midwest ISO plan will yield any short-term
improvements, the plan is certainly on the right track as a long-term solution to
interconnection queue congestion, and it should serve as an adequate starting
point for other regional transmission providers drafting their own reform
proposals.
As a short-term solution, it is unclear that the Midwest ISO plan will have
much, if any, effect on the immense queue backlogs in the Midwest. The plan's
fast-track and temporary interconnection options should enable many projects
to move forward much faster than under Order No. 2003. In particular, wind
projects seeking interconnection in remote areas with relatively simple
interconnections could benefit from either the fast-track or the temporary
interconnection option. However, even if such projects are accelerated through
the interconnection process, the limited availability of transmission capacity in
the wind-rich areas of the Midwest will likely prevent any meaningful paring of
the queue. 15 Further, although the plan's milestones and deposit requirements
should ultimately weed out many speculative projects, reaching this
equilibrium could entail queue chum and its attendant re-study delays, as
interconnection customers withdraw from the queue in reaction to the new
measures. 116 Last, the Midwest ISO plan does nothing to reduce the time
required to conduct interconnection studies, a seemingly simple short-term
solution to queue backlogs that was recommended by FERC in its post-
112 Id.
113 Midwest 1SO Amendment Filing, supra note 101, at 19.
114 Id. at 3.
115 See Matthew L. Wald, Wind Energy Bumps into Power Grid's Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2008, at Al.
116 The Midwest ISO queue reforms will be implemented sixty days after the date of FERC's
approval order. Midwest ISO Approval Order, 124 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,183,
61,891-92, 90 (Aug. 25, 2008). Thereafter, study deposits and milestones are applied to all
interconnection customers that have not commenced a facilities study.
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conference order." 7 Rather, in one instance, the plan actually increases the time
allotted for the system impact study from the ninety-day limit of Order No.
2003 to a full year." 8
As a long-term solution, the Midwest ISO shows promise in correcting the
well-known faults of Order No. 2003: excessive interconnection customer
flexibility; the first-come, first-served queue priority mechanism; and
insufficient queue entry requirements and suspension penalties. But more
fundamentally-and more importantly-the Midwest ISO plan marks a
significant increase in the authority granted to independent transmission
providers in managing their interconnection queues. Rather than demanding
mechanistic application of the queue priority rules under Order No. 2003, the
Midwest ISO plan requires a much more proactive role for the transmission
provider in managing interconnection requests. Both the Pre-Queue Phase and
fast-track procedures grant the transmission provider greater discretion in
moving viable projects quickly toward interconnection and dissuading non-
viable projects from entering the queue. Moreover, although queue progression
milestones are currently limited to those approved by the Commission, these
milestones also comprise a significant increase in the transmission provider's
authority to distinguish and promote promising generation projects. Going
forward, increased authority to distinguish among commercially viable projects
will certainly benefit the Midwest ISO.
D. Suggestions for Future Reforms
Moving beyond the Midwest ISO plan, the Commission and regional
planners could still improve upon Order No. 2003. As a general
recommendation, the Commission should continue to expand the authority and
discretion granted to transmission providers in managing interconnection
queues. To be sure, the absence of any such authority and discretion is arguably
the surest way to prevent undue discrimination in the interconnection process;
however, to achieve efficiency in managing a vast interconnection queue in a
near void of any real planning or managerial discretion requires a mechanical
system of exceptional robustness in the face of the many competing
imperatives that define today's power industry. Order No. 2003 was a
reasonable attempt at such a system, but its track record clearly indicates that it
has failed to reach that ideal.
In that they have little, if anything, to gain by favoring one generator over
another, independent transmission providers should be given broader latitude in
117 Order on Technical Conference, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,267, 18,269, 12 (Apr. 3, 2008).
118 Under Order No. 2003, the System Impact Study must generally be completed within
ninety days of signing the System Impact Study Agreement. LGIP, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,933, 49,941, § 7.4
(Aug. 19, 2003). Under the Midwest ISO plan, "[t]he Transmission Provider shall use Reasonable
Efforts to complete the Interconnection System Impact Study within one (1) year after the start of the
Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement, with due diligence used to complete the study as soon
as practicable." Midwest ISO Interconnection Procedure, supra note 111, § 7.4.
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crafting interconnection policies that allow them to accelerate the most
promising projects toward interconnection. Rather than blindly following the
goal of "minimiz[ing] the opportunity for undue discrimination,,"1 9
interconnection procedures should be flexible enough to allow and encourage
independent transmission providers to duly discriminate in favor of those
projects that have the most reasonable chance for commercial success.
Although such provisions would necessarily introduce subjectivity to the
interconnection procedure, this is a reasonable and manageable tradeoff for the
efficiencies that could be gained in processing interconnection requests.
Moreover, subjectivity may ultimately be an unavoidable aspect of
interconnection queue management if transmission planners are forced to meet
state goals relating to renewable portfolio standards. For example, in addition
to deciding which project is "first-ready," transmission providers might
ultimately find themselves determining which project is "most green."
1. Refining Milestones
As a future long-term solution to improving interconnection queue
efficiency, regional planners should push to further refine developmental
milestones. Although any move toward milestone-based queue management is
certainly an improvement over the first-come, first-served mechanism of Order
No. 2003, milestones that are crafted too broadly will do little to separate those
projects that are most ready to advance in the queue from those that are not. A
single, one-size-fits-all approach to developmental milestones, under which all
generation projects and developers are subject to the same metrics, can be too
exclusive for some developers but too permissive for others. The site control
milestone developed by the Midwest ISO illustrates this problem. Under this
milestone, a developer must demonstrate site control upon initially submitting
an interconnection request and thereafter maintain site control throughout the
interconnection process. 120 Alternatively, a developer may post a $100,000
deposit in lieu of demonstrating site control.121 The difficulty in meeting this
requirement depends largely on the type of generation technology used. For
example, obtaining site control for a large wind energy project can require up
to hundreds of easement and leasehold agreements, whereas site control for a
fossil-fuel plant may require only a few. Yet both projects would be considered
equally ready under the site control milestone. The option to submit a $100,000
deposit in lieu of site control further diminishes the usefulness of this milestone
in that the deposit has little meaning to a large generation project. For example,
the optional deposit has little impact on developers of large wind energy
projects, which will already require committed capital ranging from tens to
119 Order No. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,846, 49,848, 11 (Aug. 19, 2003).
120 Midwest ISO Application, supra note 21, § 3.3.1.
121 Id.
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hundreds of millions of dollars. 122 For these developers, the optional deposit
comprises a relatively cheap call option on what may ultimately be a viable
project, but might just as well be a speculative queue position that contributes
indefinitely to interconnection queue congestion.
To more effectively gauge readiness to advance in the queue,
developmental milestones must reflect the inherent differences among
prospective generation projects. By incorporating such factors as the proposed
generation technology, the relative size of the project (on a power output basis),
and the business model of the developer, milestones could be crafted to provide
a more meaningful determination of which projects are most ready to proceed.
This could be accomplished by implementing a class-based milestone system,
whereby developmental milestones would be defined and applied to separate
classes of generation projects. Classes, in turn, could be created on the basis of
generating technology, total power output, or other relevant factors. For
example, separate classes defined on the basis of total power output could be
created to allow a more meaningful evaluation of a developer's demonstration
of, or commitment to, obtaining site control. Deposit requirements in lieu of
demonstrating site control could then be defined progressively to reflect the
overall capital commitment of the project. This system would allow a more
meaningful evaluation of a developer's commitment to demonstrating site
control. Creating separate classes of interconnection customers should not be
equated with discriminating against certain generating technologies or types or
sizes of interconnection customers. To the contrary, a class-based milestone
system would allow for a more appropriate "apples-to-apples" comparison of
the relative readiness of a generation project to proceed.
2. Third-Party Consultants
Focusing on short-term solutions to relieving interconnection queue
congestion, FERC should push regional transmission providers to reduce their
time frames for completing interconnection studies. The Commission has
previously recognized the contribution of lengthy interconnection studies to
queue backlogs, and has recommended such actions as eliminating the
Feasibility Study and clustered interconnection studies, to name a few. 2 Yet,
in approving the Midwest ISO plan, the Commission permitted the Midwest
ISO to significantly lengthen its interconnection study timelines.1 24 FERC
should reconsider this position. To require that interconnection customers meet
rigid developmental milestones, while not holding transmission providers to
122 The average cost for wind power development is estimated at $1 million per MW. A
twenty megawatt project-the minimum for purposes of Order No. 2003-would therefore require a
minimum capital commitment of $20 million. See AM. WIND ENERGY ASs'N, WIND ENERGY FACT
SHEET: 10 STEPS IN BUILDING A WIND FARM, available at
http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/]Ostwf fs.pdf.
123 Order on Technical Conference, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,267, 18,269, 12 (Apr. 3, 2008).
124 See supra note 118.
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similarly rigid interconnection study timelines, is to tackle only half of the
problems underlying interconnection delays. Moreover, to the extent that
reducing study timelines can likely be achieved by increasing the resources
available to conduct these studies, the Commission is ignoring what is perhaps
the lowest-hanging fruit in its search for solutions to interconnection backlogs.
An immediate measure that could add necessary resources to expedite
interconnection study timelines is the use of third-party consultants to conduct
these studies. To a limited extent, the use of third-party consultants is already
authorized under section 13.4 of Order No. 2003.125 Indeed, in its post-
technical conference order, the Commission even recommended the use of such
consultants as a means to streamline the interconnection study process.126
However, in its order approving the Midwest ISO plan, the Commission
retracted from its earlier promotion of third-party consultants. Although it
continued to "support the concept of customer commissioned interconnection
studies when an RTO is not meeting its study timelines," the Commission
nonetheless concluded that "the present state of the Midwest ISO's
interconnection queue does not afford that opportunity."'127 Given that the
Midwest ISO has estimated that processing the active requests in its current
queue would not be completed until 2050, it is difficult to see why the Midwest
ISO queue does not afford the opportunity to expand the use of third-party
consultants to expedite interconnection queue processing.128
In objecting to the use of third-party consultants to conduct
interconnection studies, FERC seemed convinced by the Midwest ISO's claim
that, due to the incorrect or incomplete assumptions made by third-party
consultants in conducting interconnection studies, RTOs and ISOs would
ultimately need to re-perform the interconnection studies using their own
assumptions, resulting in no savings in time. 129 However, this problem could be
cured by requiring third-party consultants to use the same underlying
125 LGIP, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,933, 49,944, § 13.4 (Aug. 19, 2003). Under this section, the
interconnection customer may require the transmission provider to use a third-party consultant to
conduct interconnection studies where: (1) the transmission provider and the interconnection customer
disagree as to the estimated completion time of the study; (2) the transmission provider provides notice
to the interconnection customer that it will be unable to complete the interconnection study in the time
allotted by the LGIP; or (3) the transmission provider has not completed the interconnection studies in
the time allotted by the LGIP nor has it provided notice to the interconnection customer of its inability to
meet the applicable timeline. Id.
126 Order on Technical Conference, 73 Fed. Reg. at 18,269, 12.
127 Midwest ISO Approval Order, 124 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,183,
61,902, 168 (Aug. 25, 2008).
128 Id. at 61,881, 9.
129 Id. at 61,902, 167; see also Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.
Submits Proposed Revisions to Their Open Access Transmission and Energy Markets Tariff Under
ER08-1169, F.E.R.C. Docket No. ER08-1169-000, pt. 4, tab F, at 65-67 (June 6, 2008) (testimony of
Eric Laverty, Midwest ISO), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket-search.asp (enter
"ER08-1169" into the "Docket Number" field, and then click on the documents with "Accession No.:
20080630-0028") [hereinafter Testimony of Eric Laverty] (arguing that allowing developers to conduct
their own interconnection studies would result in "[b]alkanized" transmission planning because
developers fail to consider the needs of the entire transmission region).
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interconnection study assumptions and information that are used by RTOs and
ISOs in their own interconnection studies. Moreover, enhanced collaboration
between transmission planners and third-party consultants would ensure that
third-party interconnection studies reflect the needs of the entire transmission
region in a reliable and nondiscriminatory manner, thereby avoiding the
problem of "compartmentalized transmission planning."1 30 And, although there
is a legitimate concern that sharing information with third-party consultants
could potentially compromise sensitive information regarding proposed
generation projects, this concern could be allayed by requiring third-party
consultants to adhere to confidentiality agreements.
IV. Conclusion
Transmission planners face no simple task in balancing the many
competing imperatives of today's open-access electricity framework. And, as
investment in generation continues to outpace investment in new or upgraded
transmission capacity, the problem of allocating limited transmission resources
will only increase in difficulty. Given these challenges, transmission planners
can ill afford interconnection procedures and policies that only create
additional inefficiencies in their planning processes. The Midwest ISO plan is a
reasonable first attempt at curing many of the inefficiencies that plague
FERC's pro forma interconnection procedures under Order No. 2003. Yet
policymakers can and should push for further refinement. Most importantly,
interconnection procedures should not only allow, but also encourage,
independent transmission providers to seek out and promote those projects
most ready to proceed toward interconnection. In addition, strict
interconnection timelines that apply equally to both generation developers and
transmission providers will ensure that projects do not languish in
interconnection queues.
130 Testimony of Eric Laverty, supra note 129, at 66.
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